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I. Introduction 
Beginning in the early 2000s, pay-for-performance compensation 
models started garnering more attention as more individuals expressed 
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dissatisfaction with the fee-for-service model then in place.1 At the same 
time that pay-for-performance models began gaining traction in the 
health care industry, they were also being implemented in the corporate 
sector.2 
Though researchers studying pay-for-performance models in the 
health care industry have focused mainly on the efficacy of these 
programs, a slew of scandalous headlines in the corporate sector have 
clued us into the inherent flaws present in the pay-for-performance 
compensation model. In September 2016, Wells Fargo employees, in 
response to an incentive compensation structure, opened millions of new 
customer accounts without permission.3 Wells Fargo has since 
eliminated the performance goals that inspired the scandal.4 Incentive 
compensation schemes, like pay-for-performance, have also been 
identified as a root cause of the 2008 credit crisis and the UBS tax fraud 
scandal.5 But, these ill-effects have not been relegated to the corporate 
sector. In 2013, thirty-five school district employees in Atlanta were 
indicted based on accusations that they conspired to cheat on state 
standardized tests.6 Teachers and administrators allegedly inflated 
scores to meet performance metrics and to receive financial rewards tied 
to meeting those goals.7 
These scandals, and others like them, point to an inherent flaw 
present in all pay-for-performance models: though pay-for-performance 
models are often ineffective in achieving their stated goals, they are 
very effective motivators of undesirable and unethical behaviors.8 
Reviewing the unintended effects of pay-for-performance compensation 
 
1. Uwe E. Reinhardt, The Uncertainties of Pay-for-Performance, N. Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 8, 2010), https://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/10/08
/the-uncertainties-of-pay-for-performance/. 
2. Lynn A. Stout, Killing Conscience: The Unintended Behavioral 
Consequences of “Pay For Performance,” 39 IOWA J. CORP. L. 525, 532 
(2014). 
3. Wells Fargo Changes Employees’ Pay Structure, Incentive Plan, THE 
WASH. POST (Jan. 10, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/
economy/2017/01/10/277e00ee-d751-11e6-9a36-1d296534b31e
_story.html?utm_term=.152047689c92. 
4. Id. 
5. Stout, supra note 2, at 526-27. 
6. Molly Bloom, Why Atlanta Schools are Trying Performance Pay Again, 
THE ATLANTA J.-CONSORTIUM (Oct. 19, 2014), http://www.myajc.com
/news/local-education/why-atlanta-schools-are-trying-performance-pay-
again/jTZ6aOeJ0msp6FLME6CrJN/. 
7. Id. 
8. Roomy Khan, There’s a Problem with ‘Pay for Performance,’ BUSINESS 
INSIDER (Oct. 12, 2016), http://www.businessinsider.com/theres-a-
problem-with-pay-for-performance-2016-10. 
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models is particularly timely because the Medicare Access and CHIP 
Reauthorization Act of 2015 (“MACRA”) switched Medicare providers 
to a pay-for-performance compensation model in 2017.9 If this pay-for-
performance compensation model in the health care sector leads to the 
same unintended and unethical behaviors that have occurred in the 
corporate and education industries, it would be wise to adopt counter-
incentives aimed at re-enforcing professional values and behaviors. This 
Note proposes counter-incentives that should provide an effective 
safeguard against what appears to be the most common negative 
behaviors associated with pay-for-performance models. 
Part II of this Note begins with an overview of MACRA. This 
section will explain MACRA’s key features and identify those attributes 
that make it vulnerable to the same types of unintended behaviors that 
have plagued pay-for-performance models in other industries. Part III 
begins with an examination of the unintended consequences associated 
with pay-for-performance in non-health care industries. This section 
will also discuss the research on unintended consequences present in 
non-MACRA health care pay-for-performance models, and ultimately 
makes the argument that the small negative consequences observed in 
the health care sector are symptoms of a systemic disease in pay-for-
performance generally. Part IV identifies physician disclosure standards 
as an area of law where counter-incentives could be particularly 
effective in safeguarding against these negative behaviors. This section 
provides a brief history of the evolution of physician disclosure 
standards in malpractice law, before suggesting that all courts and 
states adopt a reasonable patient standard designed to incentivize 
patient-centered care and patient autonomy—even in the face of 
countervailing financial incentives. 
II. Understanding MACRA’s Key Features and 
Vulnerabilities 
A. Design Elements Common to All Health Care Pay-for-Performance 
Models 
In order to better understand MACRA’s incentives and structures, 
it is helpful to first understand the design elements present in most 
health care pay-for-performance compensation models (“P4P”). Pay-
for-performance compensation models in health care aim at “improving 
 
9. Frequently Asked Questions: Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization 
Act of 2015 (MACRA), AM. ACAD. OF FAM. PHYSICIANS (last updated 
Dec. 2016), http://www.aafp.org/practice-management/payment/med
icare-payment/faq.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2017). 
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the quality, efficiency, and overall value of health care.”10 In theory, 
they accomplish these goals by providing health care providers with 
financial incentives for carrying out quality improvement activities and 
achieving more beneficial outcomes for patients.11 Because P4P 
programs alter the way in which health care providers are paid, they 
are primarily payment programs as opposed to quality improvement 
programs.12 Though there have been many P4P experiments in health 
care,13 all of them have the same three central design elements: 1) 
performance measurement, 2) incentives, and 3) transparency and 
consumer engagement.14   
Performance measures used in P4P programs in the health care 
world fall into three distinct categories: 1) structure, 2) process, and 3) 
outcome.15 Structural measures focus on a health care provider’s 
capacity, systems, and overarching processes.16 Process measures 
indicate the steps that a provider takes to maintain or improve the 
health of patients.17 And, outcome measures reflect the overall effect of 
the service rendered on the health status of patients.18 In other words, 
structural measures describe what a particular health care practice 
looks like, process measures describe what the provider actually does 
during a patient consultation, and outcome measures describe what 
happens to the patient after an encounter with the provider. P4P 
programs usually use a combination of structural, process, and outcome 
performance measures.19 
The incentives associated with a P4P program can be either positive 
or negative.20 Positive financial incentives can take a variety of forms, 
 
10. Health Policy Briefs: Pay-for-Performance, HEALTH AFFAIRS (Oct. 11, 
2012), http://www.healthaffairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/brief.php?brie
f_id=78. 
11. Id. 
12. See id. 
13. Id. 
14. Pay for Performance—Models, HEALTH CARE INCENTIVES IMPROVEMENT 
INSTITUTE, http://www.hci3.org/thought-leadership/why-incentives-ma
tter/pay-performance/pay-performance-models (last visited Nov. 4, 
2017). 
15. Id. 
16. Types of Quality Measures, AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RES. & QUALITY 
(Feb. 2015), https://www.ahrq.gov/professionals/quality-patient-safety/
talkingquality/create/types.html. 
17. Id. 
18. Id. 
19. See Pay for Performance—Models, supra note 14. 
20. Id.  
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but always involve the award of additional funds as a result of provider 
compliance with performance measures.21 Negative financial incentives, 
however, result in a loss of income due to the provider’s failure to 
achieve the performance objectives.22 While positive financial incentives 
appear more common generally, Medicare demonstrations that 
experimented with P4P often included negative financial incentives as 
well.23 
Lastly, P4P programs also, through transparency and consumer 
engagement activities, try to incentivize patients to choose high-quality 
providers.24 Transparency and consumer engagement efforts focus on 
presenting cost and quality evidence to patients in an easy-to-
understand manner so that patients will switch from low-quality 
providers to high-quality providers.25 
B. MACRA’s P4P Design Elements 
MACRA institutionalizes P4P concepts on a nationwide scale by 
requiring Medicare-eligible providers who meet certain criteria26 to 
participate in the Merit-Based Payment Incentive System (“MIPS”).27 
In doing so, MACRA utilizes all three of the major components of P4P 
programs—performance measurement, incentives, and consumer 
engagement and transparency.28 
 
21. Id.; Courtney Baird, Top Healthcare Stories for 2016: Pay-for-
Performance, COMM. FOR ECON. DEV. (Mar. 8, 2016), https://www.ced.
org/blog/entry/top-healthcare-stories-for-2016-pay-for-performance. 
22. See Aaron E. Carroll, The Problem with ‘Pay for Performance’ in 
Medicine, N. Y. TIMES (Jul. 28, 2014), https://www.nytimes.co
m/2014/07/29/upshot/the-problem-with-pay-for-performance-in-
medicine.html?_r=0; Top Healthcare Stories, supra note 21. 
23. See Carroll, supra note 22. 
24. Pay for Performance—Models, supra note 14. 
25. Id. 
26. See Quality Payment Program, CMS https://qpp.cms.gov/ (last visited 
Jan. 24, 2017) [hereinafter Quality Payment Program](stating physicians 
who bill Medicare more than $30,000 per year and who provide care for 
more than 100 Medicare patients a year are in the Program); see also 
MIPS Overview, QUALITY PAYMENT PROGRAM, https://qpp.cms.gov/l
earn/qpp (last visited Jan. 24, 2017)[hereinafter MIPS Overview]. 
27. See Quality Payment Program, supra note 26; see also, MIPS Overview, 
supra note 26. 
28. See John Santilli & F. Randy Vogenberg, Healthcare Decision-Making 
and Stakeholder Roles in the New Marketplace, 8 AM. HEALTH & DRUG 
BENEFITS 15, 16-17 (2015); see also Pay for Performance—Models, 
HEALTH CARE INCENTIVES IMPROVEMENT INST. (last visited Nov. 4, 2017), 
http://www.hci3.org/thought-leadership/why-incentives-matter/pay-
performance/pay-performance-models. 
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Physicians participating in MIPS are graded on data that they 
report to the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services.29 Following 
this reporting, providers are assessed a final score that is used to 
determine whether the physician receives a positive or negative financial 
incentive.30 Under the MIPS framework, providers are graded based on 
their performance relative to other providers.31 In addition to relative 
grading, MIPS implements a zero-sum financial incentive system where 
the total dollar amount of positive financial rewards paid out to high-
quality providers cannot exceed the total dollar amount subtracted 
from the income of low-quality providers.32 It is also possible that a 
provider’s compensation will not be altered by his MIPS score if that 
provider achieves an absolutely average score.33 
The MIPS framework implemented by MACRA also relies on 
consumer engagement and transparency efforts to incentivize provider 
performance and improve overall health care quality.34 Providers are 
assigned quality ratings that correspond to their final scores, and these 
quality ratings are published to the general public.35 MIPS, then, is a 
comprehensive P4P program that rewards and penalizes providers both 
financially and in the public eye based on adherence to pre-determined 
performance measures. 
C. Examining MACRA’s Potential Vulnerabilities to Unintended 
Consequences 
Though performance measures are a necessary component of all 
P4P compensation models, quality measures or clinical guidelines used 
as performance measures are particularly vulnerable to unintended 
 
29. See How to Report Quality Measures for MIPS in 2017, AM. ACAD. OF 
PHYSICAL MED. & REHAB. (Dec. 2016), https://www.aapmr.org/docs
/defaultsource/qualitypractice/mips_2017qualitymeasures_1212b74c36b
bb7f361518d86ff0000187796.pdf?sfvrsn=0. 
30. See 42 C.F.R. § 414.1405 (2016). 
31. Charles Saunders, Optimizing Financial Performance Under Value-Based 
Care, HEALTHCARE FIN. MGMT. ASS’N (Oct. 2, 2017), http://www.h
fma.org/Leadership/Archives/2017/October/Optimizing_Financial_Per
formance_Under_Value-Based_Care/. 
32. See 42 C.F.R. § 414.1405 (2016). 
33. Id. 
34. See 42 C.F.R. § 414.1335 (2016); Quality Payment Program, 10 FAQs 
about the Merit-Based Incentive Payment System (MIPS), SAIGNITE (Oct. 
2016), http://www.saignite.com/resources/faq-about-merit-based-incenti
ve-payment-mips [hereinafter Saignite]. 
35. Saignite, supra note 34. 
Health Matrix·Volume 28·Issue 1·2018 
Countering Pay-for-Performance’s Unintended Consequences by Rethinking 
the Physician’s Duty to Disclose 
409 
consequences.36 An examination of some of MACRA’s quality measures 
demonstrates their potential pitfalls. Though the quality measures are 
usually supported by clinical evidence, these guidelines are not 
infallible, and there are reasonable clinical alternatives that providers, 
without MACRA’s incentives, may choose to use instead, were 
MACRA not providing them a reward to do otherwise. Pointing out 
alternative clinical options to those incentivized by the P4P program 
demonstrates one potential ill-effect: that providers will adhere to 
guidelines despite the existence of reasonable alternatives that a patient 
might prefer. 
1. Influenza Vaccines 
Figure 1, below, shows an example of one of the preventive 
screening measures used as a performance measure by MIPS. It requires 
physicians to report either the percentage of patients six months and 
older who received an influenza vaccine during an appointment between 
October 1 and March 31, or the percentage of those patients who 
reported that they had previously received the influenza vaccine.37 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Physicians who choose to report this quality measure38 have an 
incentive to ensure that their patients choose to be vaccinated against 
the flu. However, many patients choose to forego the flu vaccine each 
season for a wide variety of reasons.39 And, despite providing patients 
 
36. See Louise C. Walter et al., Pitfalls of Converting Practice Guidelines 
Into Quality Measures: Lessons Learned from a VA Performance 
Measure, 291 J. AM. MED. ASS’N. 2466, 2466 (2004). 
37. Merit-Based Incentive Payment System, 81 Fed. Reg. 77,008, 77,686 
(Nov. 4, 2016) (to be codified at 42 CFR Parts 414 and 495). 
38. For the 2017 reporting period, providers must select six quality measures 
to submit data on, including at least one outcome measure. See 42 C.F.R. 
§ 414.1335 (2016). 
39. See Rae Ellen Bichell, Many Americans Believe They Don’t Need the Flu 
Vaccine, NPR (Nov. 27, 2015), http://www.npr.org/sections/health-
Figure 1: Influenza Immunization. Merit-Based Incentive Payment System, 81 Fed. 
Reg. 77,008, 77,686 (Nov. 4, 2016) (to be codified at 42 CFR Parts 414 and 495). 
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Figure 2: Preventive Screening for High Blood Pressure. Merit-Based 
Incentive Payment System, 81 Fed. Reg. 77,008, 77,618 (Nov. 4, 2016) (to be 
codified at 42 CFR Parts 414 and 495). 
with a number of excellent reasons to be vaccinated, no doctor can force 
a patient to be vaccinated if the patient chooses not to be.40 
Considering that 38 percent of those polled during the 2015 flu 
season indicated that they would not get the influenza vaccine, it stands 
to reason that doctors who choose to report this quality metric could 
be faced with patients who refuse to comply with their recommendation 
that they receive the vaccine.41 While physicians are afforded a choice 
as to which measures they report, it is possible that a physician will not 
know whether they are treating a particularly non-compliant or 
compliant patient population ahead of selecting their quality measures. 
And, if a high enough percentage of patients are non-compliant with a 
particular physician’s recommendation, that physician could receive 
less compensation due to his patient’s choices. This potential outcome 
provides a strong incentive for the physician to do whatever he can to 
influence his patient’s clinical choices. 
2. High Blood Pressure 
Figure 2, below, shows another quality measure adopted as a 
performance measure through MACRA. This particular measure 
requires physicians to report the percentage of patients eighteen and 
older who were screened for high blood pressure annually, and who had 
a follow-up plan based on their blood pressure reading documented in 
their medical record.42 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The U.S. Preventive Task Force, however, does not recommend 
that the follow-up take place in a clinical setting;43 instead, its guidelines 
 
shots/2015/11/27/456202280/many-americans-believe-they-dont-need-
the-flu-vaccine. 
40. Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hospital, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914) 
(overruled on other grounds). 
41. Bichell, supra note 39. 
42. Merit-Based Incentive Payment System, 81 Fed. Reg. 77,008, 77,618 
(Nov. 4, 2016) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 414 and 495). 
43. Comments and responses to comments on this measure during the 
rulemaking process clearly indicated that CMS believes the follow-up 
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recommend that a diagnosis of high blood pressure be confirmed in the 
patient’s home through the use of home-testing.44 The quality metric, 
however, by requiring physicians to document a follow-up plan in the 
patient’s medical record, incentivizes physicians to require in-office 
testing and follow-through. Physicians who choose to implement at-
home testing and follow-ups, as recommended by the U.S. Preventive 
Task Force may lack the documentation required to meet the metric. 
Additionally, patients are known to be especially non-compliant when 
it comes to showing up for follow-up appointments and follow-up 
testing.45 Nonetheless, this quality measure incentivizes physicians to 
increase in-office follow-ups, despite other experts’ recommendations to 
the contrary. Physicians who treat patients that choose not to set 
follow-up appointments may see their compensation decline and their 
reputation damaged because of their patients’ non-compliance. This 
potential outcome encourages physicians to tell patients that follow-ups 
must be done in the office, despite the existence of an alternate clinical 
method that the patient would probably prefer. This is a small example 
of the type of unethical behavior that MACRA, as a pay-for-
performance model, incentivizes. But, when aggregated, these small 
unethical behaviors, if left unchecked, represent a serious incursion and 
disrespect for patient autonomy and the right of patients to participate 
in their decisions regarding their care. 
The main difficulty with MACRA’s performance measures is that 
they tend to measure physician performance based on patient 
compliance. While physicians are incentivized to achieve certain 
outcomes, patients receive no additional incentive to comply. It is well-
established that patient outcomes are the best when patients are 
effectively involved in the decision-making process.46 Indeed, “patients 
who have more knowledge, skill, and confidence in managing their 
health, and who are more adept at navigating and using the health care 
system” often experience significantly lower health care costs as well as 
better health outcomes.47 But, a system that merely supplies physicians 
 
should take place in the office, though the language of the measure does 
not explicitly state as much. See id. at 77,208. 
44. See Albert L. Siu, Screening for High Blood Pressure in Adults: U.S. 
Preventative Services Task Force Recommendation Statement, 163 ANN. 
INTERN. MED. 778, 781 (Nov. 2015) (recommending blood pressure testing 
that is outside of a clinical setting). 
45. See Barron H. Lerner, When Patients Don’t Follow Up, N. Y. TIMES (Nov. 
13, 2014), http://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/11/13/when-patients-
dont-follow-up/?_r=0. 
46. Judith H. Hibbard & Jessica Greene, What the Evidence Shows About 
Patient Activation: Better Health Outcomes and Care Experiences; Fewer 
Data on Costs, 32 HEALTH AFFAIRS 207, 208-09 Page (Feb. 2013). 
47. Id. 
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with a small set of narrow performance measures that they have to 
adhere to or suffer a penalty incentivizes physicians to work around 
patients instead of with them.48 
3. Sinusitis 
Figure 3, below, shows two quality measures related to the 
treatment of sinusitis (sinus infections) in adults. The performance 
measures incentivize physicians 1) to wait ten days after the onset of 
symptoms before prescribing an antibiotic, and 2) to prescribe 
Amoxicillin or Augmentin if a patient still has symptoms after ten 
days.49 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Patients are often unwilling, or unable to wait ten days before 
receiving relief from severe cold and flu symptoms.50 And, clinical 
knowledge that antibiotics are unnecessary for treating colds, earaches, 
and most sinus infections, does little to dissuade patients from desiring 
a quick resolution to their ailment that will allow them to return to 
work and their lives sooner.51 The guideline imposing a wait period on 
the prescription of antibiotics, if followed, will likely lead to a high 
number of unhappy patients who, when filling out patient experience 
surveys, may believe they were given low-quality care when, in reality, 
 
48. Judith H. Hibbard et al., Does Compensating Primary Care Providers to 
Produce Higher Quality Make them More or Less Patient Centric?, 
72MED. CARE RES. & REV. 481, 491-92 (2015). 
49. Merit-Based Incentive Payment System, 81 Fed. Reg. 77,008, 77,624 
(Nov. 4, 2016) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 414 and 495). 
50. Kristine Crane, Do You Really Need that Antibiotic?, U.S. NEWS & 
WORLD REP. (Jun. 9, 2014), http://health.usnews.com/health-news/pa
tient-advice/articles/2014/06/09/do-you-really-need-that-antibiotic. 
51. Id. 
Figure 3: Adult Sinusitis. Merit-Based Incentive Payment System, 81 Fed. 
Reg. 77,008, 77,624 (Nov. 4, 2016) (to be codified at 42 CFR Parts 414 and 
495). 
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they received high-quality care. This is worrisome because it presents a 
no-win situation for the provider. If he prescribes antibiotics sooner 
than the measure allows in order to meet the patient’s expectation of 
clinical care, his pay may be docked for non-compliance. But, if he 
adheres to the quality measure, then the patient may give him a 
negative review that could also damage his livelihood. 
On the other hand, the path is not any easier for physicians who 
elect to follow the prescribing guidelines. One study found that 94 
percent of patients who believe they are allergic to penicillin (or 
amoxicillin, penicillin’s close relative) actually have no allergy to 
penicillin, or its cousins, at all.52 But, patients who have gone their 
entire lives believing that they are deathly allergic to the drug may be 
unwilling to undergo allergy testing or to try a distant relative of the drug 
for fear of a severe allergic reaction.53 This measure, then, represents 
another clinical situation in which performance measures, for better or 
worse, incentivize physicians to work against patient choices and 
preferences—a hard road for the physician to travel and another 
possible incentive for engaging in unethical behavior. 
III. Unintended Consequences Associated with Pay-
for-Performance Compensation Models 
A. Negative Effects Associated with Non-Health Care Pay-for-
Performance Models 
Research suggests that individuals who have a pre-existing and 
internal motivation to engage in an activity become less motivated 
when extrinsic motivators (like financial incentives) are introduced.54 
This research is important in the pay-for-performance context because 
it indicates that financial incentive schemes designed to encourage high-
quality work performance are ineffective in producing the desired 
behavior outcome, but very effective in producing an undesired 
behavioral change. 
Researchers studying the effect of P4P compensation models on 
employee behavior in the corporate sector have determined that these 
 
52. Allergic to Penicillin? You’re Probably Not, NBC NEWS (Nov. 7, 2014), 
http://www.nbcnews.com/health/health-news/allergic-penicillin-youre-
probably-not-n243161. 
53. Id. 
54. See Edward L. Deci, Richard Koestner & Richard Ryan, A Meta-Analytic 
Review of Experiments Examining the Effects of Extrinsic Rewards on 
Intrinsic Motivation, 125 PSCHOL. BULL. 627, 653 (1999); Michael D. 
Hanus & Jesse Fox, Assessing the Effects of Gamification in the 
Classroom: A Longitudinal Study on Intrinsic Motivation, Social 
Comparison, Satisfaction, Effort, and Academic Performance, 80 
COMPUTERS & EDUC. 152, 159 (2015). 
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payment structures increase the intensity of work.55 This increase in 
intensity tends to correspond with poor workplace attitudes and a general 
feeling of unfairness as employees feel increased pressure to perform at the 
same time that they feel inadequately compensated for their efforts.56 These 
types of workplace attitudes played out with disastrous results at Wells 
Fargo.57 In that setting, “hourly targets, fear of being fired and bonuses 
kept employees selling even when the bank started cracking down on 
abuses.”58 Despite organizational indicators that employees should 
abandon the incentivized behaviors, the misbehaviors continued until 
the incentives were actually removed.59 
Additionally, psychology studies have found that providing 
extrinsic rewards, like financial rewards, had a negative effect on 
behavior overall.60 Studies focusing on classroom behavior found that 
using extrinsic rewards and incentives decreased students’ levels of 
intrinsic motivation, satisfaction, and empowerment that ultimately 
resulted in declining test scores.61 The same study suggests that 
providing rewards for behaviors that individuals already find valuable 
or interesting without the reward, causes individuals to feel controlled, 
less satisfied with the activity, and less motivated in general.62 These 
findings are important because they suggest that pay-for-performance 
models that provide extrinsic financial rewards likely decrease the 
employee’s desire to engage in the incentivized conduct on its own 
merits. Instead of engaging in the conduct to attain an intrinsic value, 
like altruism or interest, the intrinsic value associated with the conduct 
falls away leaving only the profit motivation.63 It is this self-interested 
profit motivation that, when left unchecked, creates the opportunistic 
 
55. Chidiebere Ogbonnaya, Kevin Daniels & Karina Nielsen, Does Contingent 
Pay Encourage Positive Employee Attitudes and Intensify Work?, 27 
HUM. RESOURCE MGMT. J. 94, 109 (2017). 
56. Id. 
57. Khan, supra note 8. 
58. Id. at 2. 
59. Id.; Wells Fargo Changes Employees’ Pay Structure, Incentive Plan, supra 
note 3. 
60. See generally Deci et. al., supra note 54. 
61. Hanus, supra note 54, at 159. 
62. Id. 
63. See id.; see also Aaron E. Carroll, The Problem with ‘Pay for 
Performance’ in Medicine, N. Y. TIMES (Jul. 28, 2014), https://www.ny
times.com/2014/07/29/upshot/the-problem-with-pay-for-performance-in-
medicine.html?_r=0. 
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and unethical behavior demonstrated in the Wells Fargo and Atlanta 
public school scenarios.64 
These behavior modifications, if they occur in health care as a result 
of the financial rewards created by physician pay-for-performance 
compensation models could have disastrous results for the health of 
patients and their autonomy. 
B. Unintended Consequences Associated with Health Care P4P Models 
Studies of health care P4P compensation models suggest that these 
types of unsavory and unintended behaviors are not only present in the 
corporate sector. When physicians receive financial incentives to adhere 
to clinical quality measures, they are quickly frustrated by non-
compliant patient behaviors, resulting in an increased inclination to 
bypass established informed consent procedures, one of the most 
important safeguards of patient autonomy.65 
A study of Californian and United Kingdom (UK) physicians 
participating in a P4P program conducted in 2009 found that the 
quality-based payment program had negative effects on the patient-
physician relationship.66 In some cases, physicians suggested that non-
compliant patients find another provider so that the physician’s score 
would not suffer.67 The study confirms that participation in the program 
“appeared to increase pressure to cajole and persuade patients to secure 
their compliance.”68 Other physicians in the study reported accusing 
patients of hurting their ratings and being dishonest with about their 
financial interest in patient compliance with a prescribed treatment 
plan.69 
Additionally, in the same study, in order to meet chlamydia 
screening targets, some physicians bypassed informed consent 
altogether.70 Instead of informing patients about the screening, 
physicians simply requested a urine sample, did not inform patients 
why they were requesting a urine sample, and ran the test without the 
patient’s permission.71 A physician who admitted to bypassing informed  
64. See Tamara C. Bellifanti, Beyond Economics in Pay for Performance, 41 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 91, 134-35 (2014); Stout, supra note 2, at 534. 
65. Hibbard et al., supra note 48, at 483; McDonald et al., Pay for 
Performance in Primary Care in England and California: Comparison of 
Unintended Consequences, 7 J. HEALTH SERV. RES. & POL. 121, 123-24 
(2009). 
66. McDonald et al., supra note 65, at 123. 
67. Id. at 123. 
68. Id. 
69. Id. 
70. Id. at 123-24. 
71. See id. at 124. 
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consent in this manner stated that his office originally sent out letters 
to patients informing them that they were overdue for the chlamydia 
screen.72 But, out of a few hundred letters sent to patients, only about 
five patients total responded to the letter and scheduled an 
appointment to receive the necessary screening.73 Consequently, the 
physician bypassed informed consent procedures in order to shore-up 
his own quality rating and the quality-rating of his medical group.74 
Though patients suffered no bodily injury as a result of this physician’s 
actions, his choices still harmed the patient because he took away the 
patient’s opportunity to consent to the diagnostics. The physician’s 
actions are particularly dangerous because he knew that his patients 
did not want that particular screening. If they did, they could have, 
and probably would have, responded to the mailing notifying them that 
the test was available. 
When a physician has reason to know what the patient wants—
either from the patient directly, or through circumstances of which the 
physician is aware—and acts contrary to the patient’s known wishes, 
he violates the patient’s right of self-designation and autonomous choice 
that was established in Schloendorff v. Soc’y N.Y. Hospital when 
Justice Cardozo, laying the groundwork for modern informed consent 
malpractice claims, wrote that “[e]very human being of adult years and 
sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own 
body.”75 
A second study conducted in Minnesota found that primary care 
physicians, when faced with the implementation of a quality-based 
payment program, were least likely to focus their efforts on improving 
patient engagement and patient involvement in treatment planning.76 
The physicians who participated in the study reported that one of the 
factors causing the most frustration was “the fact that patients’ lifestyle 
behaviors influenced their salaries.”77 Indeed, 70 percent of the 
physicians who participated in the study viewed patient behavior as a 
significant obstacle to improving their quality metrics.78 One physician 
reported his frustration that “[y]ou can’t make people come in. You 
can’t make them eat healthy, stop smoking, take their medication. But 
you can be punished as a physician if your numbers don’t look good.”79 
 
72. Id. 
73. Id. 
74. See id. 
75. Schloendorff, 105 N.E. at 93. 
76. Hibbard et al., supra note 48, at 487. 
77. Id. at 490. 
78. Id. 
79. Id. at 491. 
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Additionally, the study found that those physicians who focused on 
patient activation and engaging patients in the decision-making process 
reported the most frustration with patient behavior.80 
A systematic review of the literature surrounding the United 
Kingdom’s health care pay-for-performance model found that the 
program encouraged physicians to focus inappropriately on those 
aspects of patient care that were rewarded.81 The study goes on to note 
that this clinical tunnel vision caused quality of care to decline for those 
conditions that did not have incentives attached to them.82 
Studies of the UK program also indicate that providers are 
increasingly experiencing competing agendas.83 The provider has one 
agenda created by desire to adhere to performance measures and the 
patient has another agenda related to their personal health.84 One 
physician described the competing agendas this way: “[a]nd there have 
been 1 or 2 occasions where I went through the cholesterol, the 
depression, the CHD, and everything else, and ‘Oh, that’s wonderful, 
I’m finished now,’ and the patient said ‘Well, what about my foot then?’ 
‘What foot?’”85 Some of the physicians interviewed also indicated that 
they were less willing to give patients what they want and were less 
willing to accept a patient’s refusal of recommended treatments.86 While 
most doctors indicated that they would not pursue the measures if they 
thought they would be bad for the patient, other physicians indicated 
that they experienced a tension between doing what was best for the 
patient and doing what the indicator required of them.87 Overall, studies 
of the UK pay-for-performance compensation model indicate that the 
clinician-patient relationship was decidedly altered by the 
implementation of the program and that the alterations were not always 
positive.88 
These studies reveal the tension that providers feel between 
adhering to traditional professional values and following performance  
80. Id. at 491-92. 
81. Martin Roland & Stephen Campbell, Successes and Failures of Pay for 
Performance in the United Kingdom, 370 NEW ENG. MED. J. 1944, 1947 
(2014). 
82. Id. 
83. Stephen M. Campbell, Ruth McDonald & Helen Lester, The Experience 
of Pay for Performance in English Family Practice: A Qualitative Study, 
6 ANNALS FAM. MED. 228, 231 (2008). 
84. Id. 
85. Id.  
86. See id. Interviewed physicians also emphasized that the patient’s wishes 
ultimately comes first. 
87. Id. 
88. See id. at 233. 
Health Matrix·Volume 28·Issue 1·2018 
Countering Pay-for-Performance’s Unintended Consequences by Rethinking 
the Physician’s Duty to Disclose 
418 
measures associated with financial incentives. Though the health care 
industry has yet to experience the kinds of devastating consequences 
experienced in other industries, the indicators of additional unethical 
behavior are present in health care. For example, Wells Fargo’s incentive 
program was based on the idea that employees should be rewarded for 
reaching sales targets. 89 On the surface, such a plan appears innocuous. 
But, soon one employee casts aside ethical principles and opens an 
account without a customer’s permission, and then someone else did 
the same thing, and before you know it, employees harmed millions of 
consumers with their fraudulent scheme.90 
In health care, the building blocks for this type of behavior are 
already present. At least one doctor ran hundreds of chlamydia 
screenings without patient permission.91 Providers are forgetting that 
patients have their own agendas and values associated with health care 
services.92 And, as a result, the provider-patient relationship is being 
altered in a way that minimizes patient involvement in the care and 
decision-making processes. 
IV. Physician Disclosure Standards and their Role in 
Counter-Balancing P4P’s Unintended Consequences. 
A. Background on Informed Consent 
Informed consent, as a legal requirement in all American 
jurisdictions, is composed of the following legal duties: physicians must 
1) disclose medical and treatment information to patients, and 2) obtain 
the patient’s consent before administering treatment.93 Though specific 
jurisdictions may impose different requirements, the legal requirement 
of informed consent is usually considered to be met so long as physicians 
inform patients of “[1)] the nature, purpose, risks and benefits of any 
treatment they propose to perform, . . . [ and 2)] any alternative forms 
of treatment that may exist for the patients’ conditions.”94 
 
89. Nick Clements, The Wells Fargo Reminder: Incentives Can Be 
Dangerous, FORBES (Sep. 27, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/nick
clements/2016/09/27/the-wells-fargo-reminder-incentives-can-be-
dangerous/#402d03023d13. 
90. Id; see also Matt Egan, 5,300 Wells Fargo Employees Fired Over 2 Million 
Phony Accounts, CNN: CNN MONEY (Sept. 9, 2016), http://money.cnn.
com/2016/09/08/investing/wells-fargo-created-phony-accounts-bank-
fees/index.html 
91. McDonald et al., supra note 65, at 124. 
92. See Campbell, supra note 83, at 231. 
93. JESSICA W. BERG ET AL., INFORMED CONSENT: LEGAL THEORY AND 
CLINICAL PRACTICE 12 (2nd ed. 2001). 
94. Id. 
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Physicians receive extensive training before being licensed to 
practice medicine in the United States. Patients rely on their 
physician’s medical knowledge in order to make informed decisions 
regarding their care. And, informed consent has traditionally been 
viewed as a method of protecting patients from abuse by physicians 
who act contrary to the patient’s best interests.95 By protecting patient 
autonomy and autonomous choice, informed consent allows patients to 
safeguard their own well-being and welfare.96 Deriving its roots from 
ethical theory and the civil and criminal laws of assault and battery, 
informed consent protects the bodily integrity and individual autonomy 
of patients.97 
A patient’s autonomy is protected when he is given the opportunity 
to make educated decisions regarding his health and well-being.98 But, 
because it is not possible for every individual to possess, independently, 
the specialized medical knowledge required to make informed health 
choices, patients must rely on physician expertise when making their 
decisions. This reliance allows physicians to remain in control of the 
patient-physician relationship, setting its tone, and controlling the 
content of consultations.99 As a result, if a physician decides to withhold 
information regarding risks, benefits, or alternate therapies, the patient 
is unable to make a truly informed decision and his autonomy is 
undermined. 
Unfortunately, not all patients are comfortable interacting with 
doctors and advocating for a particular treatment plan.100 And, giving 
patients free-reign to determine their own course of treatments would 
undoubtedly lead to higher healthcare costs. But, patients need not be 
given the ability to demand whatever treatments they want in order to 
support patient autonomy and empowerment. Supporting patient 
autonomy does not have to mean sky-rocketing costs, nor does it have 
to mean forcing those who are uncomfortable advocating for themselves 
(due to lack of knowledge, confidence, etc.) to do so. Instead, it means 
ensuring that all patients have the option of making their own informed 
decisions regarding their medical care instead of having to accept, 
without question, their physician’s recommendations. 
 
95. Id. at 20. 
96. Id. 
97. Id. at 11. 
98. See id. at 240-42. 
99. See id. at 161. 
100. See Elizabeth Renter, 6 Ways to Be Your Own Health Advocate, U.S. 
NEWS & WORLD REPORT (Feb. 2, 2015), http://health.usnews.com/h
ealth-news/patient-advice/articles/2015/02/02/6-ways-to-be-your-own-
health-advocate. 
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B. History of Informed Consent as a Legal Doctrine 
Informed consent, as a legal doctrine in the United States, has its 
roots in the tort theories of assault and battery.101 In 1914, in his opinion 
in Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., Justice Cardozo wrote that 
“[e]very human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to 
determine what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who 
performs an operation without his patient’s consent, commits an 
assault, for which he is liable in damages.”102 It was not until 1960 that 
courts began to look towards the tort theory of negligence as an 
alternate foundation for the doctrine of informed consent.103 In one of 
the first cases to adopt the theory of negligence, the Kansas Supreme 
Court recognized that physicians have a duty to disclose the same 
information that a “reasonable medical practitioner would make under 
the same circumstances.”104 And, while the court in that case stated 
that determining what constituted a suitable disclosure was largely a 
question for medical judgment, it also acknowledged that physicians 
have a duty to disclose potential risks associated with the physician’s 
proposed treatment plan.105 
In 1972, the California Supreme Court seized upon the Kansas 
Supreme Court’s decision in Natanson, and explained that most courts 
treated a failure to secure informed consent to a medical treatment as 
a violation of the physician’s professional duty of due care.106 Viewing 
a failure to obtain informed consent as the dereliction of a professional 
duty fits it squarely within the purview of a negligence theory of tort 
liability because it corresponds exactly to the first element of any 
negligence claim.107 The negligence theory was applied by courts in 
instances where a previously undisclosed potential risk of an 
appropriate treatment ultimately occurred.108 The California Supreme 
Court held that the battery theory of liability should be reserved for 
those instances in which the patient consents to one treatment and 
receives a different treatment altogether or instances in which there is 
no consent to treatment at all.109 Under this theory of informed consent  
101. ARNOLD J. ROSOFF, INFORMED CONSENT: A GUIDE FOR HEALTH CARE 
PROVIDERS, 1 (1981). 
102. Schloendorff, 105 N.E. at 93.. 
103. See Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 8 (Ca. 1972). See also, Natanson v. Kline, 
350 P.2d 1093, 1101 (1960). 
104. Natanson, 350 P.2d at 1106. 
105. Id. 
106. Cobbs, 502 P.2d at 8. 
107. Id. 
108. Id. 
109. Id. 
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malpractice, all jurisdictions originally adopted the purely professional 
standard of disclosure.110 
1. The Purely Professional Standard of Physician Disclosure 
Under the purely professional standard, a physician is only required 
to disclose those alternatives to a proposed treatment that are generally 
recognized and accepted by reasonably prudent physicians.111 Thus, the 
purely professional standard allows the medical community to self-select 
the information that must legally be disclosed to a patient regarding 
treatment risks, benefits, and alternatives.112 In Culbertson v. Mernitz, for 
example, a patient with cervical fibroid tumors underwent surgery for 
treatment, but the physician did not inform the patient that the surgery 
could cause her cervix to adhere to the wall of her vagina.113 The 
undisclosed risk actually occurred and as a result the patient had to 
have both ovaries removed.114 The court in Culbertson determined that 
the physician’s non-disclosure did not constitute a failure to comply 
with the purely professional standard of disclosure because a medical 
review panel at the physician’s hospital determined that it was not a 
risk usually disclosed by local physicians.115 Though the patient in 
Culbertson suffered a serious injury that could have been avoided with 
the choice of an alternate treatment method, the patient was not given 
enough relevant facts so that she could properly choose one type of 
surgery over another. But, because it was not common practice for 
physicians to disclose that particular risk before operating, the patient 
was unable to recover. This case demonstrates the dangers of the purely 
professional standard of disclosure—poor habits by physicians that 
undermine informed choice and patient autonomy can legally be 
allowed to continue so long as enough physicians have the same poor 
habits. 
2. The Reasonable Patient Standard of Physician Disclosure 
In the early 1970s, some jurisdictions began to question the wisdom 
of the purely professional standard and instead adopted a reasonable 
 
110. Id. at 9; David M. Studdert, et al., Geographic Variation in Informed 
Consent Law: Two Standards for Disclosure of Treatment Risks, 4 J. 
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 103, 104 (2007). 
111. See e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 31-9-6.1(a)(5)(LexisNexis 2017); Culbertson v. 
Mernitz, 602 N.E.2d 98, 100 (In. 1992); Cobbs, 502 P.2d at 9; Canterbury 
v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 783 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
112. See Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 783; Rosoff, supra note 101, at 34-35.
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patient standard of disclosure.116 Based on the notion that “the patient’s 
right of self-decision shapes the boundaries of the duty to reveal,” the 
court in Canterbury decided that the physician’s communications to the 
patient must be determined based on the patient’s need.117 Thus, under 
the reasonable patient standard adopted in Canterbury and Cobbs, the 
physician has a duty to disclose all of the information that is relevant 
to a patient’s meaningful choice regarding treatment.118 A physician, 
therefore, has the duty to disclose all information that is material to 
the patient’s decision so that the patient can weigh the risks of the 
proposed treatment against his or her “subjective fears and hopes.”119 
The reasonable patient standard expands physician disclosure 
standards substantially. It requires physicians to disclose not only all 
the material risks of a recommended invasive treatment, but also the 
risks and benefits of not recommended, but reasonable, noninvasive 
treatments, diagnostics, and other forms of clinical care.120 Jandre v. 
Wis. Injured Patients & Families Comp. Fund provides a clear picture 
of the desirability of this standard. 
In Jandre, a patient presented to the emergency room with 
symptoms that could be either Bell’s palsy or stroke.121 The physician 
treating the patient performed a series of diagnostic tests before 
diagnosing the patient with Bell’s palsy.122 A few days later, the patient 
suffered a stroke that could have been detected at the time of his 
emergency room visit had the physician used an alternate diagnostic 
tool.123 At the time of the emergency room visit, the physician did not 
inform the patient of the existence of an alternate and more reliable 
diagnostic tool that could more conclusively rule out the possibility of 
a stroke.124 The court held that the physician breached her duty to 
disclose when she failed to inform the patient of the existence of an 
alternate diagnostic tool because she had reason to know that the 
patient would value that information in making decisions about his 
clinical care.125  
116. Studdert et al., supra note 110, at 104-05. 
117. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 786-87. 
118. Cobbs, 502 P.2d at 9-10; Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 787. 
119. See Cobbs, 502 P.2d at 9-10. 
120. See Allen v. Harrison, 374 P.3d 812, 817 (Okla. 2016); see also Jandre v. 
Wis. Injured Patients & Families Comp. Fund, 813 N.W.2d 627, 636 
(Wisc. 2012). 
121. Jandre, 813 N.W.2d at 634. 
122. See id. 
123. Id. 
124. Id. 
125. Id. at 666. 
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3. Modern Standard for Physician Disclosure 
Though support for the reasonable patient standard initially grew 
quickly, only about half of the states have adopted that standard.126 
The other half of the states retained the purely professional 
standard.127According to one study, in those states that apply the 
reasonable patient standard of disclosure, plaintiffs were significantly more 
likely to prevail in their informed consent cases.128 The authors of the study 
indicate that “cases with very similar clinical facts” are decided differently 
depending on the jurisdiction in which the suit is brought.129 While 
attorneys are used to the legal variations that exists in different states, 
the authors suggest that this kind of geographic variation sends mixed 
messages to physicians about their legal obligations and may prevent 
the medical community from effectively implementing standardized 
disclosure guidelines.130 For example, the Ethics Manual published by 
the American College of Physicians follows the purely professional 
standard, even though it is undoubtedly used in jurisdictions that apply 
the reasonable patient standard.131 This text instructs physicians to 
disclose potential alternative treatments to the patients, but it does not 
suggest that physicians may have a duty to disclose treatment options 
that the physician does not actually recommend.132 Physicians who rely 
 
126. Studdert et al., supra note 110, at 105-06. 
127. Id. The authors of the geographical study indicate that Colorado and 
Georgia have adopted standards that are not easily categorized as either 
a purely professional or reasonable patient standard. D.C. adopted the 
reasonable patient standard. Id. at 105. 
128. Id. at 103, 120. 
129. Id. at 121. 
130. Id. 
131. See AM. C. OF PHYSICIANS, ACP ETHICS MANUAL (6th ed., 2011), 
https://www.acponline.org/clinical-information/ethics-and-
professionalism/acp-ethics-manual-sixth-edition-a-comprehensive-
medical-ethics-resource/acp-ethics-manual-sixth-edition#disclosure. 
Though the manual notes that any “information that is essential to and 
desired by the patient must be disclosed,” the manual does adopt the 
purely professional standard because the onus is placed on the patient to 
request additional information or to make their specific wishes known to 
the physician. For example, the manual states that the “practice of 
informed consent rel[ies] on patients to ask questions when they are 
uncertain about the information they receive.” This practice is in contrast 
to the patient-centered standard which requires physicians to make a 
complete and full disclosure based on their patient’s values and places the 
onus on the physician to be sure that the patient understood the risks and 
benefits of the procedure as well as the availability of any alternative 
treatment options. Id. 
132. See id. 
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on this resource to outline their ethical obligations to their patients may 
end up ignoring their legal obligations of disclosure. 
C. Adopting the Reasonable Patient Standard of Disclosure in All 
Jurisdictions 
In light of the types of unintended behavioral consequences 
regularly associated with pay-for-performance compensation models, 
and in order to counter-balance MACRA’s probable effects and therefore 
preserve patient autonomy, all jurisdictions should adopt the reasonable 
patient standard of physician disclosure. Adhering to the purely 
professional standard, because of its reliance on professional consensus, 
is likely to perpetuate the ill behavioral effects of the pay-for-
performance model. 
Adopting the reasonable patient standard would require physicians 
to disclose all methods of clinical intervention—and their attendant 
risks and benefits—that are medically reasonable and appropriate given 
the patient’s condition.133 The duty to disclose would not be triggered 
only by invasive procedures, but also by noninvasive treatments or 
procedures.134 The reasonable patient standard of disclosure, in part 
because it is divorced from the norms present within the medical 
community, requires physicians to consider patient’s individual 
circumstances and values. This emphasis on individual patient 
circumstances encourages physicians to think about patients as people 
instead of as clinical conditions.135 Evidence from the UK’s pay-for-
performance physician compensation program indicates that shortly 
after the introduction of a P4P model in health care, physicians are 
more likely to focus on checking boxes, prescribing the indicated 
medication, and are significantly less likely to spend time counseling 
patients.136 Adopting a disclosure standard that requires physicians to 
learn what their patients value in order to avoid an increased risk of 
liability should effectively counter this kind of unintended effect 
associated with P4P programs. 
The danger of financially incentivizing physicians to adhere to a 
government-issued standard of care is that physicians may be less 
inclined to disclose the existence of alternative treatments to patients, 
especially given that alternative treatments would no longer be simply 
 
133. Jandre v. Wis. Injured Patients & Families Comp. Fund, 813 N.W.2d 
627, 636 (Wisc. 2012). 
134. See id. 
135. Id. at 818. 
136. See Kath Checkland, et al., Biomedicine, Holism, and General Medical 
Practice: Responses to the 2004 General Practitioner Contract, 30 SOC. 
HEALTH & ILLNESS 788, 800 (2008)(discussing the increased prevalence of 
the biomedical model of health at the expense of the holistic model of 
health). 
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alternative; instead, alternative treatments, were they to be selected, 
would represent a clear deviation from the prevalent standard of care. 
The MACRA payment scheme means that physicians are 
incentivized to adhere to certain treatment standards developed and 
implemented by the government. The quality measures, and the 
obligation of physicians to adhere to those quality measures, replaces 
independent physician judgment. From the administrative perspective, 
replacing independent medical judgment with uniform quality 
standards can only be a positive—it will standardize the care that 
patients receive and it will increase the quality of care received by 
patients. 
Informed consent and the duty to disclose currently play a strong role 
in protecting patient autonomy and encouraging the patient-physician 
relationship to be interactive.137 Indeed, informing the patient of 
“alternatives to the recommended treatment is crucial to medical 
decision making.”138 And, while physicians should inform the patient of 
the medical treatment that is medically preferable, a patient may 
choose an alternative treatment based on “values, preferences, goals, 
and needs.”139 A patient is under no obligation to choose the medically 
superior treatment or to agree to any treatment whatsoever.140 
Under MACRA, however, physicians run the risk of decreasing 
their compensation if the patient elects a non-standard option. 
Therefore, physicians have a significant financial incentive to ensure 
that all of their patients select the standard treatment option. It stands 
to reason, therefore, that physicians have a strong incentive to bypass 
informed consent procedures or coerce patients to comply with a specific 
treatment option that the patient may have otherwise refused. While 
existing medical malpractice laws provide some deterrence to 
physicians, if a physician who conducts himself in this way happens to 
live in one of the states that still applies the purely professional 
standard of physician disclosure, it is unclear that, in the event that 
patient suffers an injury, that the patient will be able to prevail in his 
medical malpractice suit since the purely professional standard affords 
such a high degree of discretion to the medical community in 
determining what must legally be disclosed to a patient. 
Evidence of the unintended consequences associated with pay-for-
performance in other industries is particularly relevant to this point. 
Unethical behavior by one individual participating in the P4P program 
is likely to cause others to adopt the same behaviors to receive the same 
 
137. See Berg, supra note 93, at 3. 
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rewards.141 This is a particular danger under MACRA’s particular pay-
for-performance scheme since physicians are graded relative to their 
colleagues. If one physician manages to engage in productive and 
profitable unethical behavior, there is an increased incentive for other 
physicians to do the same to receive a financial reward or avoid being 
assessed a financial penalty. 
Some might suggest that so long as the quality measures are good, 
there is no harm in withholding information from patients or engaging 
in other unethical behaviors. But, when these negative behaviors are 
aggregated, the cost to patients could be enormous. If all physicians lie 
to patients about their treatment options, then soon informed consent may 
become an antiquated legal relic. Also, research studies consistently report 
that health care outcomes and costs improve when patients are 
effectively engaged in the clinical process.142 By encouraging gaming 
behaviors that effectively limit the patient’s involvement in the clinical 
process, the P4P system may actually be working against its own 
objectives of improving quality and reducing costs. 
In order to prevent the unintended consequences caused by the 
creation of strong financial incentives for physicians to adhere to the 
government-mandated standard of care, the physician’s duty to disclose 
within the context of informed consent should be strengthened 
considerably. As it currently stands, physicians have a general duty to 
disclose basic information about any given treatment or procedure, but 
the standard is the most lenient when it comes to the physician’s duty 
to disclose alternative treatment options to the patient.143 
Though the concept of alternatives is extremely important within 
the doctrine of informed decision-making, “the requirement that they 
be disclosed is sometimes absent in case law and statutes.”144 And, 
among jurisdictions, there is little conformity as to what constitutes an 
alternative treatment.145 By strengthening the duty to disclose to include 
a requirement that physicians disclose all medically-feasible alternative 
treatment options to patients, informed consent procedures may provide 
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an important counter-incentive for physicians to respect patient 
autonomy. 
Though patients are free to consent or not to consent to medical 
treatments, there are concerns about the societal costs of a patients’ 
non-compliance with medical directives. For example, it is often argued 
that parents who refuse to vaccinate their children expose society at 
large to increased risks of contracting disease.146 But, there is little to 
no evidence that P4P programs are actually effective in improving 
population health.147 Therefore, implementing these programs and 
allowing the unintended consequences to occur unchecked, will 
probably not improve public health. But, failing to adopt counter-
incentives that re-enforce professional values could have a strong 
societal cost all on its own. 
Expanding the physician’s duty to disclose to remove the 
physician’s discretion in choosing what information is relevant to 
disclose is necessary in response to the new financial incentives created 
by MACRA. Under the FFS payment model, physicians still receive 
compensation if patients select an alternative treatment model; 
however, under a pay-for-performance compensation model, physicians, 
if their patients refuse the government-prescribed treatment, are in 
danger of receiving less compensation. Thus, physicians have a strong 
incentive to limit disclosure about other treatment options to patients. 
V. Conclusion 
MACRA called for the adoption of a quality-based payment system 
with the dual goals of cutting costs and improving the quality of care 
that patients receive from all physicians.148 MACRA, as a pay-for-
performance compensation models, assigns physicians financial rewards 
or penalties based on their compliance with specific performance 
measures. Like all pay-for-performance programs, MACRA will likely 
have serious unintended consequences. 
In MACRA’s case, physicians have a strong incentive not to 
disclose all medically feasible treatment and diagnostic options to their 
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patients. And, research studies suggest that in addition to failing to 
disclose alternatives to patients, physicians may also engage in 
fraudulent behaviors in order to achieve performance goals and reap 
rewards.149 These results are not surprising given the many public 
scandals in the corporate sector as a result of compensation 
incentives.150 Given the high probably of these sorts of negative 
behaviors, and given that these negative behaviors tend to act in a way 
that degrades patient autonomy, counter-incentives aimed at increasing 
professional respect for patient autonomy are highly desirable. 
Because informed consent evolved as a legal doctrine with an eye 
towards protecting patient autonomy, strengthening its standards 
should act as an effective safeguard against the anticipated negative 
behaviors associated with pay-for-performance systems. To this end, all 
jurisdictions should adopt the reasonable patient standard of physician 
disclosure. 
Though all jurisdictions presently recognize that physicians have a 
legal duty to disclose certain information to their patients prior to 
initiating treatment, jurisdictions are divided on which standard should 
be employed to determine if the physician has actually met his duty to 
disclose. 
The variation between jurisdictions makes it more difficult to be 
certain that all patients are given the opportunity to participate in the 
formulation of their own treatment plan. In roughly half of all 
jurisdictions, physicians are only required to disclose the information 
that a reasonably prudent physician in the same practice area would 
disclose.151 Now, if all physicians are incentivized to comply with the 
government-issued standard of care, then requiring physicians to 
disclose only what a similarly situated reasonably prudent physician 
would disclose does not ensure that a patient will hear about the 
medically feasible alternatives that lie outside of that standard of care. 
In order to ensure that all patients have the opportunity to make 
informed decisions regarding their own care, all jurisdictions should 
adopt the reasonable patient standard of physician disclosure. The 
reasonable patient standard requires physicians to disclose all 
information that they have reason to know is material to the patient’s 
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decision regarding treatment.152 Jurisdictions that have adopted this 
standard require physicians to disclose not just the physician’s 
recommended treatment with its attendant risks and benefits, but also 
treatment options that the physician would not recommend.153 By 
following this standard, patients are afforded a more complete picture 
of their health care choices and then are free to choose to accept their 
physician’s recommendation or pursue another course of clinical action. 
The important point to note is that under the reasonable patient 
standard, the choice of clinical treatment is completely the patient’s 
own, and the physician-patient relationship serves to educate the 
patient so that they can make an informed decision.154 
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